Origins of Project COPPER (Redux)

Ed:  This is an update to Earl Daniels' original article from October 2016.

Thanks to Earl Daniels for this reminiscence:

COPPER
(Consolidation of Pay and Personnel)
The Beginning

During the 2016 RAFINO/RAFINCO Reunion Colonel J. Claude Wallace provided an update of the automated system (IPPS-A) that is following in the footsteps of COPPER.  Having watched, with much interest, the evolution of COPPER, I could not help but to think the time has come for the historical beginning of COPPER to be documented.  Of particular interest for me has been to observe the transition from adamant opposition to one of embracement of the concept.  For that I am grateful.  Soon you will understand why.

Prior to 1972 there was a command titled, The Combat Development Command or CDC.  Its mission was to consider all aspects of combat from war fighting to administrative support.  At some point, it was decided there needed to be a separation of the combat functions from the administrative functions.  Thus, the creation of the Personnel and Administrative Combat Development Agency (PACDA), a subordinate command of the Training and Doctrine Command or TRADOC.  The war fighting functions of CDC went to Fort Leavenworth.

PACDA’s mission was to focus upon how administratively the Army could support the doctrine that was emerging from the war fighting scenarios.  In addition, PACDA was given the responsibility to identify solutions to administrative problems that had become more troublesome during Viet Nam.  In short, PACDA was considered to be an administrative “think tank” for TRADOC.  Later, I will share some examples of what I am speaking.  And, although PACDA was physically located in the Army Finance Center, there was no connection between the two.

Upon my graduation from the Finance Officer Advance Course I was assigned to PACDA.  For me, it was like a joint assignment, because it was the first time I had worked in an office where Adjutant General Officers (AG), Data Processing Officers and Finance Officers worked side by side. My primary job was to update the Finance Tables of Organizations and Equipment (TOEs) for support of new or changed combat missions.  My secondary job, which I enjoyed more, was problem solving.

One of the problems that became more troublesome for the Army during Viet Nam was the identification of deceased soldiers for which the identification tag (Dog Tag) had been damage beyond reading and there were no fingers for which prints could be obtained.  Many soldiers were labeled “Missing in Action” when in fact, their body was destroyed beyond identification.  Identification through DNA did not exists.

One of the problem solving tasks that I was given to work on was the development of an indestructible dog tag.  In this project, I collaborated with Natick Laboratory in Natick, Massachusetts.  Eventually a tag was developed; but, it was too expensive to field to the entire Army.

Another project I was tasked with was to consider, for the purpose of identifying deceased soldiers, the feasibility of implants of micro-chips, either in soldiers’ teeth or in their arm pits.  That project was quickly scrubbed because some, at Headquarters, Department of Army, felt the idea was too much like what the Germans did to the Jews in WWII.

In early 1974, the AG captain, whose desk was next to mine, Hershal Webb and I were called into the office of our boss, LTC Taylor.  LTC Taylor was an AG officer. I cannot recall his first name.  He informed us that TRADOC had decided PACDA was to develop a plan to merge the personnel and pay functions.  We were to develop the plan, the time line and conduct testing of the plan.  From the onset we knew this was going to be a difficult challenge.

Our first job was to identify all the personnel functions that drove the pay system, such as promotions, entitlements, incentive pay, etc.  Keep in mind, in those days, there were no computers with “Word” capability, so everything was hand written and/or manually typed or charted.  I know we, manually, did hundreds of document flow charts.

To preclude having to type “Merger of Pay and Personnel” over and over we needed come up with an acronym.  Neither of us liked “MEPAP” (Merger Pay And Personnel).  After consulting the dictionary we found merger meant to combine.  Of course, that didn’t have the unique ring generally associated with acronyms; but, we agreed that combining meant the same as “consolidation”. Thus the birth of Consolidation of Pay and Personnel, or COPPER for the title of the project.

In late 1974, the plan was completed and briefed to TRADOC. We also attempted to brief it to members of the finance and personnel communities (The commandants of both the Finance and AG school, and their selected representatives.)  Needless to say, while the AG representatives, at best, gave the plan a luke warm reception, the finance folks were adamantly opposed.  The finance folks viewed this to be another attempt by AG to take over Finance.

We were then directed to test the plan in early 1975.  The site selected was Fort Bragg.  Fort Bragg was selected for primarily three reasons.  First, Fort Bragg offered the opportunity to test the plan at both the installation level and the division level.  Second was the geographical proximity of the finance offices with the personnel offices.  The in and out processing stations were already co-located.  And, the other finance and personnel operations were located in the same buildings.  Finally, and just as important, Fort Bragg was very receptive to be the test site because they wanted to be on the leading edge of this new concept, should it be adopted.

The test revealed the concept had merit but there were some serious problems.  The biggest problems, as I recall, were technician training, the perception of a lack of discipline in document processing on the personnel side and the rigid lines between the two disciplines.  In other words, the personnel were not embedded with one another.  Finally, and one we probably did not understand nor visualize was the importance of, the much later to be developed, automation capability.

We returned to Fort Harrison to address the problems we had identified and to develop recommendations for fixes that might flesh out the concept for further testing.  After several months of work, TRADOC asked the concept be tested in Europe.  It was opinioned that if it could be made to work in Europe, it could be made to work anywhere.

About that time, the summer of 1975, I received orders for a finance account assignment in Bremerhaven, Germany.  Can’t say I was particularly excited about the location, but felt, as a captain, I needed to have an account. 

Within a couple of weeks of receiving those orders, I received a call from Major Jimmy Dillard, my assignment officer, advising I was being diverted to Heidelberg to be available to assist with the testing of COPPER when it arrived in Europe. Accordingly, I was assigned to Central Finance Accounting in Heidelberg with a reporting date of September 1, 1975.

In late 1975, it was learned COPPER would be coming to Germany in early spring of 1976.  I was then re-assigned to the DCSRM to be available to participate in testing that was going to take place in Frankfurt and Stuttgart.

To the best of my recollection, the test results in Germany proved to be even more dismal than the results from Fort Bragg.  While I do not recall all the problems encounter, I do recall what I believe to be the greatest.  The test was met with complete opposition at both the leadership and technician level.  The orientation briefings, which occurred before the testing ever began, was one of dissensions and arguments to where there were times when I thought there was going to be physical confrontation.  Animosity toward the CONUS (Continental United States) folks was one of total disregard for the fact the folks were just following orders.   I remember receiving some verbal attacks when it was learned I was one of the authors.  Mostly, it was the question of where my head was located when some of the requirements were written.  Fortunately, as a member of the DCSRM staff, most of the time I only received dagger stares.

From that day forward I have only received glimpses of the evolution of the concept.  And while about forty-two years have passed since the first pen was put to paper, by two captains working in the bowels of PACDA, I am pleased to learn that COPPER’S time may have now arrived.  And, yes, I am proud of the role played in getting the wheel of the TRADOC idea rolling.           

In closing, I believe the cause for length of the time to implementation has been two fold. First, automated technology was not at the point where the two complicated systems could be effectively and efficiently integrated.  Secondly, time was needed for the old hard line generation that could not accept the one system concept, to rotate out of the Army.  The younger generation does not let tradition become a barrier to progress and the advancement of new ideas.  Someone in TRADOC must be commended for having an idea that was far ahead of its time.  COPPER was one of those ideas.

LTC Ron McGee offers his recollections of COPPER below:

I am writing to you as the RAFINO Secretary concerning the recent RAFINO article about Project COPPER.  I tried to write an update to the article on the website but was unsuccessful.  So I thought I’d write to you and you can have it printed in a future edition of RAFINO, or do with it as you wish.  But for historical purposes there are some bits of information that I believe need to be corrected.  Also, in no way am I questioning what the author wrote in his article.  I don’t recall knowing the author or ever having worked with him on the project.  I just believe that the record on COPPER should be corrected, or at least modified.  We have slightly different views on Project COPPER so I guess one view is as good as another.

I transferred from the 1st Infantry Division at Ft. Riley, Kansas to Ft. Harrison in 1973.  I believe that the PACDA organization had recently been formed.  As is the case with the formation of new organizations, things were a bit hectic during the first year or so.  To be honest, no one in PACDA at the time knew what to do!  There was no guidance at all from any higher command. 

I believe that at the end of 1974 or the beginning of 1975 General Mundie, the Commanding General of Ft. Harrison at the time, tasked me with running Project Copper.  So I believe that I was the first actual Project Manager for Project COPPER when it started under that name.  As the article stated, we did have Finance and AG officers working side-by-side attempting to develop COPPER.  Before I took over the project it was managed by a LTC Taylor, as the article states, before it became COPPER.  As a side note, Taylor had held every rank from Private First Class to LTC during his Army career.  Not to be argumentative, but I believe that the COPPER name was decided on by a group of guys just sitting around and throwing out project names.  

The TRADOC Commanding General visited Ft. Harrison and was briefed on the project probably in late 1974.  Around the same time, and possible early 1975 the Chief-of -Staff of the Army also made a visit to Ft. Harrison.  He was briefed on several ongoing administrative projects and I was directed by General Mundie to brief him on Project COPPER.  Also, during my stint as the Project Manager I was required to make several visits to the Pentagon to brief senior officers there on COPPER.   

The organization for testing COPPER was the 82nd Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg.  I was required to travel to Ft. Bragg with some other team members about every couple of weeks or so.  When testing began we used the statistical package SPSS to measure the results of the testing.  On just about every trip to Bragg I had to carry a computer tape containing Finance records for the 18th Airborne personnel.  Dave Mazo was the Finance Officer there at the time and worked with us during the testing phase.  A Colonel Robert J. Wallace was the Deputy Test Director for Ft. Bragg.  In February 1976 he awarded me a plaque making me an honorary member of the Project CAR Test Headquarters, as it was then called.  Not a big deal, but thoughtful of him.

I believe that sometime in late 1975 or early 1976 there was a meeting of all Finance Officers at the Finance Center.  They gathered there to be briefed on several subjects, one of which was COPPER.  So I gave them my briefing on COPPER.  Lieutenant General Kjellstrom was present at the session.  General KJELLSTOM was a personal friend of mine since serving with him in Manheim, Germany in 1957.  From that time until I retired in 1976 he and I would meet many times in different locations.  When I finished my COPPER presentation General Kjellstrom took over the podium and emphatically told all the Finance Officers present there that, words to the effect, COPPER would never happen!  Not a direct quote, but pretty close.  He didn’t believe that the Adjutant General Corp could ever get their act together to make it work. 

 It’s interesting that the article states that TRADOC asked to have COPPER tested in Europe in 1975.  That’s news to me, because in early June 1976 General Mundie ordered me to go to Europe and make presentations to senior personnel there on Project COPPER, what it meant to them and approximately when it could be implemented.  So two of my officers and myself made the two week trip to Europe and made the required presentations.  Remember – this was the first two weeks of June 1976, so I don’t understand how COPPER was to be tested in Europe in 1975 when, according to General Mundie and others, senior officers there had very little knowledge of COPPER.  That’s why he sent us there to update them.  

In 1975 - 1976 mini-computers were being introduced to businesses to replace the large scale computers that were being used at the time.  A couple of my officers and I went to a presentation at a hotel in Indianapolis to determine if COPPER could be used on mini-computers in a theater of operations.  This effort was shot down by the senior personnel at PACDA.

I retired from the Army on June 30, 1976.  A couple of months later I received a letter from my old golfing partner, Brigadier General Bill Andrews, the CG of the Finance Center, notifying me that Project COPPER had been terminated.  No explanation was given and I have no knowledge if it was ever tested in Germany.  The author of the RAFINO article was correct in his conclusions of having the old hard line generation retire before such a project could move forward.  I have not kept up with whatever changes are planned that seem to be something like COPPER.   

One final note:  At one point during the testing of COPPER, probably in 1976, I wrote an article for a military publication stating that at the time, COPPER would not work in a combat situation.  After writing the article I happen to meet Claude Wallace in the Finance Center one day and he was quick to express his displeasure with me for writing the article.  He was not happy!

I am not nit picking the RAFINO article.  This is just a different view on what happened during Project COPPER.

Ronald R. McGee
LTC USA Retired