RAFINO

RAFINO Report
ISSUE 22 - Summer 1999
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COPPER
Consolidation of Pay and Personnel
(Or whatever it is called now)


By J. Claud Wallace

I keep hearing rumors that this person or that one is claiming to be the author of COPPER.  This article is to prove that the real author is myself, and to testify that, after I became wise to the fact that it was a bad idea, I did everything I could to bury that bad idea.  I will also make a case for extreme care for the "Service to the Troops" if the corpse is dug up.  I will be as specific as I can recall and name as many names and dates as I can remember.  Naturally, there are many side stories that there will not be room to cover.  Believe me the parts of the story that I include really are related to COPPER.  (I asked Mel Richmond before he passed away to review my draft.  He made one suggestion which I am following.  He said to tone it down and delete some of the personal references.) (Ed: Your editor also deleted a few.)

CS3 (Combat Service Support System) -- When I graduated from C&GSC in 1967, I became a chameleon -- I was the representative of the COA, assigned to the Office Chief of Staff with duty station at Fort Hood, TX, on the CS3 team with 4 other LTCs each representing his DA staff area, i.e., Supply, AG (Personnel), Signal, and ADP.  LTC Ed Spence was the DCSPER representative, an AG officer who is always excluded when I say anything uncomplimentary about AGs.  Ed and I were called "the gruesome twosome" with some justification.  Ed - bigger than I -- was probably more knowledgeable (at least a better student) in his field than I in mine, and still to this day one of my dearest friends.

Back to the subject - One of our several projects in CS3 was to develop relationships between Pay and Personnel.  For illustration purposes I will take one item that would seem to be the easiest to assume a relationship between Pay and Personnel: "Centralized Promotions".  This item called for MILPERCEN to report promotions to USAFAC and for the field finance units to keep their hands off.  It became reality and sometimes worked beautifully.  Some commanders became upset when their new MSG was paid for his new grade before the unit was notified.  Sometime later we found that MILPERCEN had difficulty making cutoffs and in reporting all the promotions.  (If I had been smart, I would have seen a real problem at this point, but I was still a systems animal steeped in theory and convinced that we could do wonders). 

CAMPS (Centralized Army Military Pay System) - Once upon a time, long, long ago, DOD told the services to develop a Uniform Pay system.  The Army developed CAMPS at the Finance Center (USAFAC) and tested, and tested, and tested.  The computer equipment selected for the system by the Office, Vice Chief of Staff was several Univac 494 machines.  This selection did not meet with the approval of USAFAC staff creating further complications.  The Vice Chief sent LTC Bob Adams from his office to Indianapolis to see what the problem was.  Bob reported that the Finance Center was not capable of completing and fielding the system.
 
At this time I had moved from the CS3 team to work for Colonel John Currier in the Office, Comptroller of the Army.  Mr. Benewitz was the Deputy Comptroller.  One day John told me to go see Mr. Benewitz.  His message could well have ended with "this message will destruct in 5 seconds.…and if you should get caught…".  What Mr. Benewitz had told me was to pick a team and take 3 to 4 weeks to find a solution to the CAMPS problem.  I told him that I would pick a team of 3 or 4 experts and would need only 1 week for the job, if it could be done at all.  The team I picked was available and we left DC with an open return date.

On the 5th or 6th day we had an exit interview with the CG of USAFAC in which we stated our unfortunately unpopular position as:  "The Center was ready, willing and able to complete the test and field the system."

PS3 (Personnel Service support System - In mid- 1972 I was detailed to the PS3 Study Group headed by MG Sparrow.  We traveled the world over looking for ways to improve Pay and Personnel support to the Soldier.  At the end of the study, LTC Jim Eubank, the AG representative, and I wrote the portion of the report that Pay and Personnel had to be combined.  The consolidation of Pay and Personnel was called COPPER.  

We fielded JUMPS (Joint Uniform Military Pay System), tested collocation of Pay and Personnel files at Ft. Bragg.  The test was unsuccessful and time went on.

In December 1976 I became Chief of Finance and Accounting in US ARMY, EUROPE.  Sometime during my 3˝ year tour in Europe the Personnel Center at Ft. Harrison revived the idea of combining Pay & Personnel.  In Germany, with JUMPS fully implemented, two significant things occurred: 1) I found isolated cases where outstanding and smart Personnel Warrant Officers lined up with JUMPS and service to the troops was very good.  They went to the "A to Z" file system and loved the results, but most Personnel Officers insisted on 'Unit Integrity'; and 2) the DCSRM, General Dick Fazakerley and I became of one mind.  We were both convinced that pay service could not possibly be adequate in a combined environment.

I returned to Ft. Harrison from Europe several times for meetings on the Consolidation of Pay and Personnel at the request of General Fazakerley who had moved to command USAFAC.  I held firmly to the position that tests and live examples had failed to produce the accuracy and reliability that was required for the pay of our troops.

At the 1996 and 1998 RAFINO/RAFINCO reunions the briefers have listed " Collocation of Pay and Personnel" as a bullet on a chart to be accomplished.  I was reminded of the warning that "He who fails to learn from history is doomed to repeat it." 

I have searched for reasons why something that is so obvious in theory just doesn't work.  In discussion with friends I have found a few things that may help to understand that.

a. Pay is a strict, regulated and time sensitive procedure, while Personnel insists on flexibility.
b. Personnel is organized for direct support while Pay is provided by area support.
c. When the two functions are put together, the product is made up of so many complicated disciplines, procedures and subjects that the chief, (whoever he or she may be) cannot possibly be branch qualified.  This problem of a large quantity of skills multiplies when you consider junior officers, NCOs, enlisted soldiers and civilian employees and their abilities to grasp the scope of their responsibilities. 

It is my earnest prayer that some responsible official will be able to gain some insight from this detailing of a 24 year career where COPPER has been a recurring nightmare that has wasted resources and resulted in countless victims of failed tests.